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Introduction to Post-Quantum Cryptography in scope of NIST's Post-
Quantum Competition 
Abstract: 
Nowadays, information security is essential in many fields, ranging from medicine and 
science to law enforcement and business, but the developments in the area of quantum 
computing have put the security of current internet protocols at risk. Since quantum 
computers will likely be able to break most of our current cryptostandards in trivial time, a 
need for stronger and quantum-resistant encryption algorithms has arisen. During the last 
decades, a lot of research has been conducted on the topic of quantum-resistant 
cryptography, yet none of the post-quantum algorithms have yet been standardized. This 
has encouraged NIST to start a program to select the future post-quantum cryptography 
standards. This thesis gives an overview of different types of quantum-resistant algorithms 
for public key encryption and signature schemes, using the examples from NIST’s post-
quantum cryptography standardization program. The aim of this paper is to compose a 
compact material, which gives a person with computer science background a basic 
understanding of the main aspects of post-quantum cryptography. 
Keywords: 
Post-quantum cryptography, post-quantum cryptography standardization, lattice based 
cryptography, code based cryptography, multivariate polynomials, hashes 
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Postkvantkrüptograafia alused NISTi standardiseerimisprogrammi  
põhjal 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Tänapäevases veebipõhises maailmas on andmeturve paljudes valdkondades määrava 
tähtsusega, kuid hiljutised edasijõudmised kvantmehhaanika valdkonnas võivad tänased 
interneti turvaprotokollid ohtu seada. Kuna kvantarvutid on tõenäoliselt võimelised murdma 
meie praeguseid krüptostandardeid, tekib vajadus tugevamate krüpteerimisalgoritmide 
järele. Viimaste kümnendite jooksul on postkvantkrüptograafia saanud palju tähelepanu, 
kuid siiani pole ükski postkvantkrüptograafiline algoritm standardiseeritud ulatuslikuks 
kasutamiseks. Selle tõttu algatas NIST programmi, mille eesmärk on valida uued 
krüptostandardid, mis säilitaks oma turvalisuse ka kvantarvutite vastu. Käesolev lõputöö 
annab ülevaate postkvantkrüptograafia erinevatest valdkondadest kasutades näiteid NISTi 
standardiseerimisprogrammist. Lõputöö eesmärk on koostada ülevaatlik materjal, mis 
annaks informaatika või matemaatika taustaga tudengile laiahaardelised algteadmised 
postkvantkrüptograafia valdkonnast. 
Võtmesõnad: 
Postkvantkrüptograafia, postkvantkrüptograafia standardiseerimine, võrepõhine 
krüptograafia, koodipõhine krüptograafia, räsipõhine krüptograafia 
CERCS:   P170 - Arvutiteadus, arvutusmeetodid, süsteemid, juhtimine 
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1. Introduction 
Ever since the research in the field of quantum computing was initiated in the early 1980s, 
it has been an area of great interest for many scientists. Today, it is widely believed that a 
fully functional quantum computer will be built and ready for use in a wide variety of fields 
in the coming decades. Quantum computers can solve problems that are not feasible for 
conventional computers in a reasonable time by using particles that can be in superposition. 
Instead of using binary digits (bits) to encode data, quantum computers use quantum bits 
(qubits) which can take on the binary values 0 or 1 or both simultaneously. [1] 
While quantum computers can be used efficiently in scientific research and many other 
fields to advance the humankind, a large-scale quantum computer will pose many new 
problems, one of them being the security of digital communications. Quantum computers 
will be able to break most of the public-key cryptosystems that are in use today in trivial 
time. Due to that, many scientists have started researching the possibilities of quantum-
resistant cryptography (also called post-quantum cryptography) in order to create 
cryptosystems that would endure attacks from both conventional computers and quantum 
computers.  
In order to create utilizable quantum-secure cryptosystems, scientists need to overcome 
various challenges. For example, it is likely that quantum-resistant algorithms will need to 
have larger key sizes than the algorithms that are in use today, which in return may result in 
the need to change some of the Internet protocols. Due to that, the future standards of post-
quantum cryptography need to go through thorough examination and consideration. [2] 
As the need for stronger cryptography is getting more substantial, different measures are 
taken to address the problem. Even though transitions from smaller key sizes and algorithms 
have already been proposed, they will not be enough to endure attacks by quantum 
computers. Thus, in 2016 NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) started a 
competition, which will be referred to as NIST’s Post-Quantum Competition in this paper, 
that aims to find, develop and standardize quantum-resistant cryptosystems that would in 
the future replace our current cryptographic standards. Proposals for quantum-resistant 
public key encryption, digital signature and key exchange algorithms were accepted until 
the submission deadline late in 2017. Those submissions will have to go through three 
rounds of serious examination and testing over the next few years. The final draft standards 
will assumingly be released between 2022-2024. [3] 
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This thesis aims to give an overview of the submissions to the NIST’s post-quantum 
cryptography standardization program. Firstly, an examination of the submissions is 
presented, introducing the generalities of the competition. Then we look into the most 
common types of algorithms used to provide post-quantum security using the examples from 
the NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standardization program submissions. As a result, a 
concise paper is composed, which should give a person with previous knowledge in the 
sphere of computer science or mathematics an overview of the basic principles of post-
quantum cryptography. 
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2. Submissions to NIST’s Post-Quantum Competition 
The current chapter presents an overview of the submissions to the NIST’s post-quantum 
competition and is based on the official information from NIST’s webpage. [4] 
2.1 Round 1 
Due the submission deadline in late 2017 in total 69 ideas were submitted and accepted by 
NIST, including 20 digital signature algorithms and 49 public key encryption or key 
encapsulation schemes. Only two submissions provided all key encapsulation, public key 
encryption and digital signature algorithms together, namely DME and Post-quantum RSA.  
It is also important to note, that even though post-quantum RSA scheme was accepted as a 
submission by NIST, it is considered a satirical submission, since for it to be feasible and 
provide reasonable security, the key sizes would have to be too large to use effectively in 
real world. 
Before the start of the second round, five submissions were withdrawn. In addition, two 
submissions – HILA5 and ROUND2 – were merged into a new submission called 
ROUND5. 
With five submission withdrawn and two merged together, 63 proposals remained under 
consideration at the end of the first round. 
Proposed algorithms fall into four main categories based on the type of the algorithm: 
lattice-based, hash-based, code-based and multivariate. The most popular algorithm type in 
the first round submissions was based on lattice-based cryptography with a total of 25 
submissions using lattice-based cryptography, including five digital signature algorithms 
and twenty public key encryption or key encapsulation algorithms. Nineteen submissions 
were using code-based cryptography, out of which only two were digital signature 
algorithms. To the contrary, hash-based algorithms were only used in digital signature 
algorithms. A small part of the algorithms did not belong to any of the aforementioned 
families. The number of submissions of each type is portrayed in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1. Round 1 submissions by type. 
 
Based on the submissions to the first round of NIST’s post-quantum competition, lattice-
based and code-based algorithms are the preferred candidates for future cryptostandards. 
2.2 Round 2 
The Round 2 submissions were announced in the end of January 2019. 26 candidates were 
selected out of the 63 candidates from Round 1, including 17 public-key encryption 
algorithms and 9 digital signature schemes.  
Most of the remaining candidates fall under the category of lattice-based cryptography, 
making up 12 out of 26 Round 2 submissions. Just as in the first round, the second most 
common algorithm type is based on coding theory. Multivariate polynomial based systems 
were most favoured for digital signature schemes with four schemes. Other families, such 
as hash-based, elliptic curve and zero knowledge were represented once each. Figure 2 
below depicts Round 2 candidates by algorithm type. 
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Figure 2. Round 2 submissions by type. 
 
In the coming upchapters, the main families of quantum-resistant algorithms are introduced 
in more detail, specifically lattice-, code-, hash- and multivariate polynomial based. 
Examples from NIST’s post-quantum competition are used where appropriate. 
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3. Lattice-based algorithms 
More than a third of the algorithms proposed to NIST’s post-quantum cryptography 
standardization program were built on lattice-based cryptography. In total, twenty-five 
lattice-based schemes were proposed during Round 1. Lattice-based cryptosystems are 
favoured due to their proof of worst-case hardness security and quantum-resistance. In 
addition, lattice-based systems are often more efficient, because they do not require any 
difficult computations. [5] 
One of the main drawbacks of lattice-based algorithms is their newness, hence the security 
parameters like key length are not well established and understood. This is a relatively small 
problem, since in the past years the number of publications on the topic of lattice-based 
algorithms has grown substantially. [6]  
The following chapters are based on multiple different works on lattice-based cryptography, 
such as a Master’s thesis by F. Bergami [7], multiple papers by O. Regev [8, 9] and other 
works on the topic [10-12]. In the end, an example from NIST’s post-quantum 
standardization program is described briefly, solely based on its documentation [13]. 
3.1 Preliminaries 
A basis of lattice ℒ is an arbitrary set of linearly independent vectors 𝐵 =  {𝑏𝑖⃗⃗⃗  } such that 
ℒ = {∑𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖⃗⃗⃗  ∶ 𝑎𝑖 ∈ ℤ}. In other words, basis is a set of vectors that can be used to reproduce 
any point in the lattice. We denote a lattice ℒ  with basis 𝐵 as ℒ(𝐵), where basis 𝐵 can be 
thought of as an 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrix with columns 𝑏𝑖⃗⃗⃗  . 
The lattice ℒ generated by basis 𝐵 is the set of all the integer linear combinations of the 
vectors in 𝐵. Intuitively, a lattice can be thought of as a regularly spaced infinite 𝑛-
dimensional grid of points.  
Bases are not unique – multiple bases can generate the same lattice. Two bases 𝐵1 and 𝐵2 
are equivalent if and only if 𝐵1 = 𝐵2𝑈, where 𝑈 is a integer matrix with a determinant of 
±1 (unimodular matrix). 
Figure 3 below depicts a 2-dimensional lattice with basis 𝐵 = {𝑏1⃗⃗  ⃗, 𝑏2⃗⃗⃗⃗ }. In practice, the 
dimension 𝑛 has to be rather large to provide reasonable security. 
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Figure 3. Two-dimensional lattice with base vectors 𝑏1 and 𝑏2. 
 
λ1(ℒ) denotes the length of the shortest non-zero vector in ℒ. More generally, λk(ℒ) denotes 
the smallest radius of a sphere containing 𝑘 linearly independent vectors:  
λk(ℒ) ≔ min {𝑟: ℒ contains k linearly independent vectors of length ≤  r} 
The cryptographic systems using lattices are based on various computational problems: 
 Shortest vector problem (SVP) – given a basis 𝐵, find a vector of length λ1(ℒ(𝐵)). 
One of the most common variations of SVP is SVP𝛾 – given a basis 𝐵, find a vector 
of length ≤ 𝛾λ1(ℒ(𝐵)); 
 Shortest independent vectors problem (SIVP𝛾) – given a basis 𝐵, find 𝑛 linearly 
independent vectors in ℒ(𝐵) of length ≤ 𝛾λn(ℒ(𝐵)); 
 Closest vector problem (CVP) – given a basis 𝐵 and a randomly chosen point 𝑣, 
find the closest lattice point to 𝑣 in ℒ(𝐵). A less strict version of this is CVP𝛾 – given 
a basis 𝐵 and a point 𝑣, find a lattice point that is at most 𝛾 times farther from 𝑣 than 
the closest lattice point to 𝑣. 
Multiple other variations of these problems are used in practice. One of the most common 
one is GapSVP𝛾 – given a basis 𝐵 and a real 𝑑, decide between λ1(ℒ(𝐵)) ≤ 𝑑 and 
λ1(ℒ(𝐵)) > 𝛾𝑑. 
All of these problems are hard to solve and despite intensive research, no efficient algorithm 
has been found for any of these problems.  
One of the reasons why lattice-based cryptosystems are one of the most promising options 
for future cryptostandards, is their worst-case security guarantee. That means that breaking 
their security is known to be at least as hard as solving the underlying lattice problem in any 
of its instances including the worst one. 
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3.2 Learning With Errors 
In 2005, Regev published a paper, in which a reduction from worst-case lattice problems 
such as GapSVP and SIVP to a certain learning problem was presented. [9] This learning 
problem, called learning with errors (LWE), has become the basis for most modern lattice-
based cryptosystems. 
Fix a size parameter 𝑛 ≥ 1, a modulus 𝑞 ≥ 2 and an error probability distribution 𝜒 on ℤ𝑞. 
The Learning With Errors problem consists of recovering a secret 𝑠 ∈ ℤ𝑞
𝑛 given a 
sequence of approximate random linear equations on 𝑠: 
𝑎1 ← ℤ𝑞
𝑛, 𝑏1 = ⟨𝑠, 𝑎1⟩ + 𝑒1 
𝑎2 ← ℤ𝑞
𝑛, 𝑏2 = ⟨𝑠, 𝑎2⟩ + 𝑒2 
⋮ 
𝑎𝑖 ∈ ℤ𝑞
𝑛 is chosen uniformly at random and 𝑒𝑖 ∈ ℤ𝑞 is chosen according to 𝜒. The error 
distribution 𝜒 is a normal distribution rounded to the nearest integer of standard deviation 
𝛼𝑞 where 𝛼 > 0. 
In order to provide worst-case hardness 𝛼 must satisfy 𝛼𝑞 > √𝑛, as indicated by Regev. [9] 
Let us note, that the problem of recovering secret 𝑠 is equivalent to finding 𝑒, since without 
the noise, the system can be solved using Gaussian elimination. 
The adaptation of LWE presented above is referred to as search-LWE. Another very 
common variation of LWE is decision-LWE. The aim of decision-LWE is to distinguish 
pairs (𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖), where 𝑏𝑖 = ⟨𝑠, 𝑎𝑖⟩ + 𝑒𝑖 from uniform pairs (𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖), where 𝑏𝑖 is chosen 
uniformly at random. 
While the actual reduction from lattice problems such as GapSVP to LWE problem is 
beyond the scope of this work, a more intuitive connection between lattices and LWE is 
given. Having 𝑛 samples of 𝑏𝑖 = ⟨𝑠, 𝑎𝑖⟩ + 𝑒𝑖 from the LWE distribution, we can present the 
associated vector 𝑏 = (𝑏1, … , 𝑏𝑛) as 𝑏 = 𝐴𝑠 + 𝑒, where 𝐴
𝑇 = (𝑎1|… | 𝑎𝑛) and 𝑒 =
(𝑒1, … , 𝑒𝑛) is a small noise vector. In that case, we can think of 𝐴𝑠 as a point in the lattice 
ℒ(𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑛), defined by the coefficients from 𝑠. Since 𝑒 is small, 𝑏 must be quite close to 
this lattice point, thus finding the secret vector 𝑠 corresponds to the closest vector problem 
(CVP), which in term can be translated to SVP problems. 
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3.3 Regev’s cryptosystem 
Using the problem of learning with errors, a simple cryptosystem can be built. This 
cryptosystem is parameterized by the security parameter 𝑛, number of equations 𝑚, modulus 
𝑞 and a real noise parameter 𝛼 > 0. 
Key generation 
The private key is a vector 𝑠 chosen uniformly from ℤ𝑞
𝑛. The public key consists of 𝑚 
samples (𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖) from the LWE distribution, where 𝑏𝑖 = ⟨𝑠, 𝑎𝑖⟩ + 𝑒𝑖, using the secret 𝑠, 
modulus 𝑞 and a noise parameter 𝛼. 
Encryption 
For each bit of the message a random set 𝑆 is uniformly chosen among all 2𝑚 subsets of 
[𝑚]. If the bit is 0, the encryption is (∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑖∈𝑆 , ∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑖∈𝑆 ), otherwise if the bit is 1, the 
encryption of the bit is (∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑖∈𝑆 , ⌊
𝑞
2
⌋ + ∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑖∈𝑆 ). 
Decryption 
The decryption of a pair (𝑎, 𝑏) is 0 if 𝑏 − ⟨𝑎, 𝑠⟩ is closer to 0 than to ⌊
𝑞
2
⌋ modulo 𝑞, and 1 
otherwise. 
 
Let us note, that without the error 𝑒, the system could be easily solved with Gaussian 
elimination and 𝑏 − ⟨𝑎, 𝑠⟩ would always be either 0 or ⌊
𝑞
2
⌋. Thus, the decryption error occurs 
only if the sum of the errors over chosen set is greater than  
𝑞
4
, which does not happen due 
to the chosen error distribution. In order to better understand Regev’s cryptosystem, an 
example with small parameters is presented.  
Example 
Parameters used in this example are 𝑞 = 3, 𝑚 = 4 and 𝑛 = 3. Let us assume that Alice 
wants to send Bob an encrypted message. Bob’s secret key 𝑠 = (2 0 1)𝑇 is chosen uniformly 
at random. Public key consists of the pair (𝐴, 𝑏), where 𝐴 is a 4 × 3 matrix 
𝐴 = (
1 2 2
1 2 0
0 1 0
2 0 1
) 
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and 𝑏 = (1 2 0 2) is a vector. 
If Alice wants to send a message to Bob, she chooses a random subset of rows from 𝐴, in 
this case she has chosen rows 1 and 3. She then has to calculate the encryption of her 
message, based on the bit that needs to be encrypted. If the bit is 0, its encryption is 
(∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑖∈𝑆 , ∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑖∈𝑆 ) = ((1 0 2), 1), while if the bit is 1, the encryption is (∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑖∈𝑆 , ⌊
𝑞
2
⌋ +
∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑖∈𝑆 ) = ((1 0 2), 2). When Bob receives the message, he needs to compute 𝑏 − ⟨𝑎, 𝑠⟩. 
In the first case (if the encrypted bit was 0), the result is 𝑏 − ⟨𝑎, 𝑠⟩ = 1 − 4 = 0. Since it is 
closer to 0 than to ⌊
𝑞
2
⌋  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞, he can be sure that the original bit was 0. In the other case, 
where the encrypted bit was 1, he calculates 𝑏 − ⟨𝑎, 𝑠⟩ = 2 − 4 = 1, which in term is closer 
to ⌊
𝑞
2
⌋ = 1. 
A possible choice of parameters proposed by Regev that guarantee both security and 
correctness is the following:  
 𝑞 is a prime between 𝑛2 and 2𝑛2 
 𝑚 =  1.1 · 𝑛 log 𝑞 
 𝛼 = 1/(√𝑛 log2 𝑛) 
Even though the cryptosystem proposed above is rather inefficient, it gives good insight into 
the field of lattice-based cryptography based on the problem on LWE. The idea of using 
LWE problem as a basis of the cryptosystem has been very popular since, which has led to 
a big amount of follow-up work and multiple improvements.  
One of the most researched variants of LWE is ring-LWE or more correctly learning with 
errors over rings. RLWE is more efficient than the regular LWE problem, but it also requires 
the use of lattices that possess extra algebraic structure – ideal lattices, the description of 
which is beyond the scope of this work. 
Ring-LWE offers multiple improvements over the classical LWE. The size of the public key 
is substantially smaller than in the LWE based cryptosystem and it is also at least as secure 
as LWE. It is proven, that just as LWE, ring-LWE using ideal lattices reduces to worst-case 
lattice problems like SVP. Despite considerable effort, no significant progress in attacking 
these problems has been made. 
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3.4 FrodoKEM 
One of the many lattice-based cryptosystems proposed to NIST’s post-quantum 
standardization program was FrodoKEM. The core of FrodoKEM is an LWE public-key 
encryption scheme called FrodoPKE, which is based on the original Regev’s cryptosystem. 
Unlike most of the algorithms proposed to NIST’s program, FrodoKEM does not use ring-
LWE as its basis, but holds to the original LWE problem.  
FrodoKEM does require moderately longer running times than the submissions based on 
ring-LWE, but in return, FrodoKEM offers simplicity and compactness, reducing the 
potential for errors. For example, the base code given in the specification can be used for 
different LWE security levels, without making major changes to the code solely by changing 
compile-time constants. FrodoKEM imposes very few requirements on its parameters, 
which makes it possible to meet almost any desired security target in an automated way. 
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4. Code-based algorithms 
Code-based cryptography has been widely researched ever since Robert McEliece published 
his groundbreaking research in 1978. McEliece cryptosystem is the first fully functioning 
code-based cryptosystem and even though McEliece cryptosystem with original parameters 
has been broken, it is still very expensive to attack. Breaking it becomes nearly impossible 
with larger key sizes. Furthermore, decryption and encryption process is faster than, for 
example, in RSA. The main disadvantage of McEliece is its already large key size. [14] 
McEliece cryptosystem is a potential alternative to current cryptography standards in the 
post-quantum world on account of the algorithm being based on the NP-hard problem of 
decoding a general linear code. Its quantum-security and speed encouraged multiple 
submissions to the NIST’s post-quantum competition, that are directly based on the classic 
McEliece cryptosystem, providing various improvements for decreasing key sizes and 
improving security.  
Other submissions based on code-based cryptography exploit the advantages of various 
codes, including different quasi–cyclic codes, Goppa codes and multiple newly introduced 
codes, which will not be explained in detail in this thesis. In this report, a cryptosystem 
based on classic McEliece system is presented.  
This chapter is mostly founded on two papers: the original report by Robert McEliece [15] 
and the Classic McEliece submission to NIST’s post-quantum standardization program [16], 
while also building upon ideas brought up in a study written in the University of Tartu [17]. 
4.1 Preliminaries 
A [𝑛, 𝑘]-linear code 𝐶 is a 𝑘-dimensional linear subspace of a finite field 𝔽 
𝑛  of size 𝑛. We 
say that code 𝐶 has a length 𝑛 and dimension 𝑘. In the McEliece cryptosystem we only work 
with binary linear codes over the field 𝔽2
 . Codewords will be expressed as bit vectors. 
The Hamming weight of codeword 𝑥 ∈ 𝔽2
𝑛, denoted 𝑤𝑡(𝑥) is defined as the number of 
coordinates that are not equal to zero. That is equal to its distance from the zero-vector: 
𝑤𝑡(𝑥) = 𝑑(𝑥, 0). 
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The Hamming distance of two codewords 𝑥 = 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛 and 𝑦 = 𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑛 is defined as 
𝑑(𝑥, 𝑦) = ∑𝑑(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
where (𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖) = {
1, 𝑥𝑖 ≠ 𝑦𝑖
0, 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖
 . 
The distance of code 𝐶 is defined as the minimum Hamming distance of any two distinct 
codewords of 𝐶:  
𝑑(𝐶) = min
𝑥,𝑦∈𝐶
𝑥≠𝑦
𝑑(𝑥, 𝑦) 
If 𝐶 is an [𝑛, 𝑘]-linear code with distance 𝑑, then 𝐶 is called an [𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑑]-linear code. 
Generator matrix 𝐺 of a [𝑛, 𝑘]-linear code 𝐶 is a 𝑘 × 𝑛 matrix whose rows form a basis of 
the code 𝐶. Let us note that the generator matrix for a linear code is generally not unique, 
since every basis of 𝐶 gives a different, but equivalent generator matrix for 𝐶. 
Let 𝐶 be an [𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑑]-linear code with generator matrix 𝐺. We say that code 𝐶 can correct up 
to 𝑡 errors, if there exists a decoding algorithm 𝐷𝑒𝑐 ∶ 𝔽 
𝑛 → 𝐶 such that for every 𝑢 ∈ 𝔽 
𝑘 
and every vector 𝑒 ∈ 𝔽 
𝑛 with weight 𝑤𝑡(𝑒) ≤ 𝑡, the word 𝑦 = 𝑢𝐺 + 𝑒 is always correctly 
decoded as 𝐷𝑒𝑐(𝑦) = 𝑢. Code C is then an error-correcting code. 
A permutation matrix 𝑃 is a binary matrix, whose every row and every column each 
consist of a single 1, while all other values are 0. That means, that multiplying any matrix 
with a permutation matrix 𝑃 results in a matrix contains all the same columns as the original 
matrix, but in permuted order. 
4.2 Construction of McEliece Cryptosystem 
Let 𝐶 be a random code, such that 𝐶 = [𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑑] for which there is an efficient algorithm 
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝐶, that can decode any codeword with up to 𝑡 = ⌊
𝑑−1
2
⌋ errors. 
Let 𝐺 be a 𝑘 × 𝑛 generator matrix of code 𝐶, let 𝑆 be a random non-singular 𝑘 × 𝑘 matrix 
and let 𝑃 be a random 𝑛 × 𝑛 permutation matrix.  
McEliece’s system is constructed as follows. 
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Key generation: 
 Pick a random 𝑘 × 𝑛 generator matrix 𝐺 of code 𝐶. Generate a random non-singular 
𝑘 × 𝑘 matrix 𝑆 and a random 𝑛 × 𝑛 permutation matrix 𝑃.  
 Public key: 𝑆𝐺𝑃 = 𝐺′ 
 Private key: (𝑆, 𝐺, 𝑃) 
Encryption: 
 Let 𝑚 be a 𝑘-bit message 
 Let 𝑒 be an random 𝑛-bit vector such that 𝑤𝑡(𝑒) = 𝑡 
 Then 𝑐 = 𝑚 · 𝐺′ + 𝑒 is the ciphertext 
Decryption: 
 The recipient uses his private key to compute 𝑃−1, the inverse of 𝑃 
 The recipient computes 𝑐′ = 𝑐𝑃−1  
 The recipient uses the decoding algorithm 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝐶 to decode 𝑐′ to 𝑚’ 
 Then 𝑚 = 𝑚’𝑆−1 is the original message 
 
Let us note that 𝑐′ = 𝑐𝑃−1 = 𝑚𝐺′𝑃−1 + 𝑒𝑃−1 = 𝑚𝑆𝐺 + 𝑒𝑃−1. Since 𝑃 is a permutation 
matrix, the weight of 𝑒𝑃−1 is equal to 𝑡. Seeing that 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝐶 can correct up to 𝑡 errors and 
𝑚𝑆𝐺 can be at a distance up to 𝑡 from 𝑐𝑃−1, the correct codeword 𝑚’ = 𝑚𝑆 will be obtained. 
Now the original message can be obtained easily by multiplying the codeword with the 
inverse of 𝑆: 𝑚 = 𝑚′𝑆−1 = 𝑚𝑆𝑆−1. 
4.3 Security of McEliece Cryptosystem 
McEliece cryptosystem is a one-way cryptosystem – that means that an attacker without any 
knowledge of the target plaintext cannot reconstruct the randomly chosen codeword from a 
ciphertext and public key. 
If an attacker got hold of an encrypted message 𝑐, he would have two possibilities in order 
to retrieve the original message 𝑚:  
1. Find out 𝐺 knowing 𝐺’; 
2. Decode 𝑐 without knowing an efficient decoding algorithm. 
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Attacks of the first type are called structural attacks, while attacks of the second type are 
called decoding attacks. The security of the McEliece cryptosystem is suggested by the 𝑁𝑃-
hard general decoding problem. 
General decoding problem of linear codes. Give an [𝑛, 𝑘]-linear code 𝐶 and a codeword 
𝑦 ∈ 𝔽 
𝑛, find a codeword 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 such that the distance 𝑑(𝑦, 𝑐) is minimal. 
Information-set decoding attack proposed by McEliece in his original paper solves the 𝑁𝑃-
hard general decoding problem, but the attack runs in exponential time. However, the same 
basic idea is used to construct attacks that are more efficient. Classic McEliece submission 
to NIST’s post-quantum program has addressed this threat as well as other possible attacks 
by choosing proper parameters and adding other various improvements. 
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5. Hash-based algorithms 
Hash-based algorithms are quite different from the other potential post-quantum schemes. 
So far, hash-based cryptography is limited to digital signatures schemes and is not used for 
key encapsulation or public key encryption. First hash-based signature schemes date back 
to late 1970s and thus their security is well understood, even against quantum attacks. [2]  
Hash-based functions rely completely on the security of the underling hash function. That 
makes hash-functions very adjustable and resistant against quantum attacks. If a hash 
function becomes insecure, it can be replaced by another, making the signature scheme safe 
to use once again. Hash-based algorithms are also very fast, because the only calculations 
required are the computations of the underlying hash function. [18] 
The main disadvantage of hash-based schemes is that they can be used for a limited number 
of signatures only. The number of signatures can be increased, but only at the expense of 
signature size. [2] 
In order for a hash function 𝐻(𝑋) to be suitable for creating secure signature schemes, it 
must possess certain properties. For example, cryptographic hash function must be a one-
way function – given a random output 𝑌 = 𝐻(𝑋) it should be hard to find an input 𝑋, which 
would satisfy 𝐻(𝑋) = 𝑌. This property is also called pre-image resistance. A similar 
property required of cryptographic hash functions is second-preimage resistance – given 
a random input 𝑋, it should be difficult to find a different input 𝑋’ that would produce the 
same hash (such that 𝐻(𝑋) = 𝐻(𝑋’)). [19] 
One of the most important properties of cryptographic hash functions is collision resistance. 
It is quite similar to second-preimage resistance, in fact second-preimage resistance is often 
called weak collision resistance. Collision resistance insures that it is computationally 
infeasible to find two different inputs that produce the same output. Collision resistance is 
important because collisions pose a serious security risk. For example, if an attacker found 
a message that produces the same hash as another authentic digitally signed message (a 
collision), they could easily exchange the original message with the fake one, while still 
keeping the same signature value. It would be impossible to distinguish them when verifying 
the signature. [20] 
The following chapters are based on multiple works by Daniel J. Bernstein et al. [21, 22] 
and an article by Matthew Green [19]. 
21 
 
5.1 Hash-based signatures 
First hash-based signature scheme was introduced by Leslie Lamport in 1979.  
Given a 256-bit cryptographic hash function and a secure random bit generator, the Lamport 
signature scheme can be used as described below. 
 Key pair generation. In order to create a private key, Alice needs to generate two 
sets of 256 random 256-bit bit strings (i.e. random numbers). These 512 values are 
her private key. To create her public key, she needs to hash all 512 values from her 
secret key. These two sets of 256 hashes (512 hashes in total) form her public key. 
 Signing a message. If Alice wants to sign a message, she first needs to hash the 
message to a 256-bit hash. Then, for each bit in the hash, Alice picks one number 
from the corresponding set of random numbers that make up her private key, based 
on the value of the bit. For example, if the bit is 0, she chooses the corresponding 
random number from the first set, and if the bit is 1, she needs to choose the 
corresponding number from the second set. 
 Verifying the signature. When Bob needs to verify Alice’s signature on a message 
he received, he also first has to hash the message to a 256-bit hash sum. Then he 
picks 256 hashes from Alice’s public key based on the hash sum, exactly in the same 
manner that Alice picked numbers for her signature – if the bit from the message is 
0, he needs to pick the hash from the first set of the public key, and if the bit is 1, he 
picks the hash from the second set of the public key. 
In order to verify Alice’s signature, Bob hashes all of the numbers in Alice’s 
signature. If every hash out of these 256 hashes match all the 256 hashes he picked 
from the public key earlier, then he can be sure that the signature is valid. 
These are the main principles of Lamport signature scheme. Evidently, the main downside 
of this scheme is that one can only use the generated key pair once, which is why it is called 
a one-time signature scheme (OTS). If we were to use the same private key twice, we would 
reveal both secret key values for some of the positions. An attacker could use this knowledge 
to forge our signature. In addition, the keys and signatures in Lamport signature scheme are 
quite large in size. 
The one-time signature scheme was later extended by Ralph Merkle who combined it with 
hash trees and thus made it possible to use one Lamport key to sign multiple messages. 
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Merkle starts with a one-time signature scheme like the Lamport signature scheme and then 
uses a binary tree of height ℎ (called a Merkle tree) to authenticate 2ℎ one-time signature 
key pairs. He places the public keys of the Lamport signature schemes into the leaves of the 
tree. All the other non-leaf nodes are hash values of the concatenation of its children, thus 
the root of the tree becomes the public key for all of the signatures and one-time signature 
secret keys become the secret key of the new scheme. Using this scheme allows to sign 2ℎ 
messages. The signer has to retain all of the Lamport secret keys for signing.  
To sign a message, the signer selects an unused public key from the tree and signs the 
message using the corresponding Lamport secret key. In addition to the Lamport signature, 
the signature in Merkle’s scheme also holds the corresponding Lamport public key and 
something called a Merkle proof. Merkle proof ensures, that the specific Lamport public 
key belongs to the tree identified by the root. 
Merkle proof is a way of making sure that the given data belongs to a Merkle tree, without 
having to provide the full tree. Since all the non-leaf nodes are just hashes of their children 
nodes, we only need to provide the siblings of the nodes that belong to the path from the 
chosen leaf to the root. 
This results in a few-time signature scheme (FTS), which can be used to generate a small 
amount of signatures. A few-time signature schemes can be extended to increase the number 
of signatures, creating many-time signature schemes (MTS). 
Merkle’s idea has since been used in many signature schemes. After more than 40 years of 
research, eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) was introduced. It has many strong 
points, but the main downside is that it is stateful. That means that signing with XMSS 
requires keeping state of the used one-time keys in order to make sure they are never used 
again. Unfortunately, being stateless is one of the requirements for the signature schemes 
proposed to NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standardization program. 
In 2015 a stateless signature scheme was proposed – SPHINCS. SPHINCS has become a 
baseline for modern hash-based signature schemes. As an important addition, SPHINCS 
uses randomized index selection – the index of the Merkle tree leaf containing an OTS key 
pair is chosen randomly, instead of applying a hash function to the message to determine 
the index. 
The hash-based digital signature schemes submitted to NIST’s post-quantum cryptography 
standardization program are both based on SPHINCS, offering various improvements in 
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security and speed. In this paper, one of two hash-based signature schemes is introduced in 
more detail – SPHINCS+. 
5.2 SPHINCS+ 
SPHINCS+ works similarly to SPHINCS. The main idea remains the same – SPHINCS+ 
authenticates a big number of few-time signature (FTS) key pairs using a so-called 
hypertree. To sign a message, a random FTS key pair is chosen. The resulting signature 
consists of the authentication information for that FTS key pair and the FTS signature. 
A hypertree consists of hash-based many-time signatures (MTS), which allow a key pair to 
sign a fixed number of 𝑁 messages, where 𝑁 is a power of 2. The many-time signature key 
pairs are held in a 𝑑-layer 𝑁-ary tree. The top layer holds a single many-time signature key 
pair which is used to sign the public keys of 𝑁 many-time signature key pairs from the next 
layer, which are in order used to sign MTS public keys from the next layer. The 𝑁𝑑−1 key 
pairs from the bottom layer are used to sign 𝑁 FTS public keys, resulting in a total of 𝑁𝑑 
authenticated FTS key pairs.  
As a result, the authentication information for an FTS key pair consists of the 𝑑 MTS 
signatures that build a path from the FTS key pair to the top MTS tree. The OTS and FTS 
secret keys together fully determine the whole virtual structure of an SPHINCS+ key pair. 
An MTS signature used in SPHINCS+ is just a classical Merkle-tree signature consisting of 
a one-time signature (OTS) plus the authentication path in the binary hash-tree. 
The structure of the SPHINCS+ key pair is fully determined by the secret keys of its OTS 
and FTS. 
A more detailed description of SPHINCS and SPHINCS+ is beyond the scope of this work. 
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6. Multivariate polynomial based algorithms 
While a number of multivariate encryption schemes have been proposed to NIST’s post-
quantum standardization program, multivariate cryptography has historically been more 
successful in signature schemes. Out of the 19 submitted signature schemes, multivariate 
algorithms take up the biggest part with seven multivariate signature schemes, four of which 
were selected for further examination and proceeded to Round 2. 
The main downside of multivariate polynomial cryptosystem is their newness. Most of the 
research during the inception of multivariate cryptography was conducted in Japan and thus 
most of the earlier publications are only available in Japanese. The amount of research of 
multivariate cryptography has grown since, but much more time is needed to prove its 
security. [23] 
This chapter is based on a paper by Jintai Ding and Bo-Yin Yang [23] and multiple 
submissions to NIST’s post-quantum standardization problem, such as HIMQ-3 [24] and 
Rainbow [25]. 
6.1 Multivariate quadratic polynomials 
Multivariate polynomial cryptography relies on the difficulty of solving systems of 
multivariate polynomials over finite fields. Most of the multivariate cryptosystems use 
quadratic polynomials and rely on the NP-hard ℳ𝒬 problem. ℳ𝒬 problem consist of 
solving a multivariate quadratic equation system over a finite field – given coefficients 𝑦𝑘, 
𝑎𝑖𝑗
(𝑘)
, 𝑏𝑖
(𝑘)
 and 𝑐 
(𝑘) find a solution (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) for 
𝑓1(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) = 𝑦1 = ∑∑𝑎𝑖𝑗
(1)
𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗 +
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑𝑏𝑖
(1)
𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝑐 
(1) 
⋮ 
𝑓1(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) = 𝑦𝑚 = ∑∑𝑎𝑖𝑗
(𝑚)
𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗 +
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑𝑏𝑖
(𝑚)
𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝑐 
(𝑚) 
where 𝑛 is the number of variables, 𝑚 is the number of equations, 𝑘 is in range 1…𝑚 and 
coefficients are all elements in finite field 𝔽 
 . 
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6.2 Construction of the Rainbow scheme 
In this paper, the multivariate quadratic (MQ) signature scheme Rainbow is introduced. The 
general structure of Rainbow over 𝔽q
  is as follows. 
Let us define a system 𝒫 = (𝑃(1), … ,  𝑃(𝑚)) of multivariate quadratic polynomials of 𝑚 
equations and 𝑛 variables by 
𝒫(𝑘)(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) = ∑∑𝑝𝑖𝑗
(𝑘)
𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗 +
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑𝑝𝑖
(𝑘)
𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝑝0
(𝑘)
 
For 𝑘 = 1,… ,𝑚 and 𝑝𝑖𝑗
(𝑘)
, 𝑝𝑖
(𝑘)
, 𝑝0
(𝑘)
∈𝑅 𝔽q
 . 
The main idea for key generation in a MQ-signature scheme is to choose a central map  
ℱ = (ℱ(1), … ,  ℱ(𝑚)) ∶  𝔽q
𝑛 → 𝔽q
𝑚 of multivariate quadratic polynomials, which can be 
easily inverted. After that two affine or linear invertible maps 𝑆 ∶  𝔽q
𝑚 → 𝔽q
𝑚 and 𝑇 ∶  𝔽q
𝑛 →
𝔽q
𝑛 are chosen, in order to hide the structure of the central map in a public key. 
A public key is the composed quadratic map  𝒫 = 𝑆 ∘ ℱ ∘ 𝑇 which is supposedly hardly 
distinguishable from a random system and therefore difficult to invert. 
A secret key consists of (𝑆, ℱ, 𝑇) which allows to invert 𝒫. 
Generating a signature 
In order to sign a document 𝑑 a hash function ℋ: {0,1} →  𝔽 
𝑚 is used to compute the hash 
value ℎ = ℋ(𝑑) ∈ 𝔽 
𝑚. The signature 𝑧 is generated as follows. 
 𝑥 = 𝑆−1(ℎ) ∈ 𝔽 
𝑚 is computed. 
 A pre-image of 𝑥 is computed under the central map ℱ, resulting in 𝑦. This pre-
image is computed using a special algorithm, which takes 𝑥 and the central map ℱ 
as arguments and returns a vector 𝑦 ∈ 𝔽 
𝑛 which satisfies ℱ(𝑦) = 𝑥. 
 Signature 𝑧 ∈ 𝔽 
𝑛 is then computed: 𝑧 = 𝑇−1(𝑦) 
 
Verifying a signature 
Given a document 𝑑 and signature 𝑧, in order to verify the signature, the hash value of the 
document has to be computed first: ℎ = ℋ(𝑑) ∈ 𝔽 
𝑚. Then ℎ′ = 𝒫(𝑧) ∈ 𝔽 
𝑚 is computed. 
If ℎ′ = ℎ holds, the signature 𝑧 is valid. 
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The figure 4 below illustrates the process of generating and verifying a signature. 
 
  
Figure 4. The process of generating and verifying a signature using the MQ-signature 
scheme. 
The Rainbow scheme includes some improvements to the basic algorithm introduced above, 
in order to increase security and speed. For example, to facilitate computations, some of the 
𝑝𝑖𝑗
(𝑘)
 coefficients chosen at random can be set to zero. 
6.3 Security of the Rainbow scheme 
Security analysis of multivariate schemes such as Rainbow is rather difficult, since no direct 
reduction from a NP-hard problem exists. Since there is no proof of the practical security 
for Rainbow, the parameter choice is crucial. In the Rainbow documentation, parameters 
are chosen in a way that the complexities of known attacks are beyond the levels of security 
required by NIST. 
Since the multivariate signature schemes are rather new, a lot of research is needed to prove 
their security. Many of the earlier multivariate algorithms have been broken. Still, due to 
their small signature sizes and fast signature verification, multivariate cryptosystems remain 
as very strong competitors for the potential quantum-resistant digital signature standards. 
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7. Conclusion 
All of the four main families have their merits and deficits. It is hard to predict which family 
of quantum-resistant algorithms will prove to be the most efficient in the future. While 
lattice-based cryptosystems have been subject to most research, code-based algorithms 
remain a solid choice for the future cryptographic standards, whilst both hash-based and 
multivariate algorithms provide secure signature schemes. Based on the number of 
submissions, lattice-based algorithms seem to be favoured the most. 
The NIST’s post-quantum standardization program gives a good overview of the field and 
presents us a variety of options for the future cryptostandards, leaving NIST with a difficult 
task of examining and testing all of the submissions to find the most efficient and secure 
algorithms. 
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